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Attempts to target public transfers efﬁciently are typically constrained by the lack
of information that government agencies have on the welfare of individuals and
households, and this is particularly true in less developed countries. Policymakers
are thus forced to select among imperfect targeting schemes to choose recipients
and non-recipients of public support. Such choices can be made based on indirect
individual indicators of welfare (such as geographic location, socio-demographic
characteristics, land ownership, or type of housing), through differentiated indi-
recttaxation(suchasfoodstuffsubsidization), orthrough”self-targeting”schemes
(such as subsidized low-wage public employment).
It has been common practice in the literature to describe the effectiveness and
the equity of these policies using mainly two types of indicators1. These are linked
to the presence of Type I and Type II errors. Type I errors arise from ”false neg-
atives” or exclusion errors, that is, they arise when eligible or poor families are
not awarded a transfer. Type II errors come from ”false positives” or inclusion
errors, which occur when beneﬁts are wrongly awarded to the non-poor or to the
non-eligible. Quoting from Weisbrod (1970),
Two issues are involved, having to do with the accuracy of the pro-
gram in assisting only the ”target” group, and the comprehensiveness
of the program in assisting all of that group. (p. 125)
It is usually argued that inclusion errors reduce the vertical efﬁciency of the pro-
grams – by failing to distinguish appropriately between the poor and the non poor
– and that exclusion errors lead to horizontal inefﬁciency, since these errors dis-
criminate among the poor.
To describe the importance of these errors, leakage and under-coverage rates
are often computed. Rates of leakage are typically deﬁned as the proportion of
total transfers going to the pre-transfer non-poor2. Deﬁnitions of under-coverage
rates vary, but are usually linked to the ratio of the number of beneﬁciaries in a
target group (e.g., the poor) to the total number of persons in that group. Clearly,
however, leakageandunder-coverageratesareincompleteindicatorsoftheimpact
of social programs on poverty. As Ravallion and Datt (1995, p. 415), put it, ”the
ability of a policy to concentrate beneﬁts on the poor should not be confused
1For recent examples, see for instance Cornia and Stewart (1995), Duclos (1995), and Schady
(2002).
2See for example Weisbrod (1970), Beckerman (1979), Atkinson (1995), Creedy (1996).
2with its impact on poverty; the former is only one determinant of the latter.” An
important reason for this is that the poor often differ considerably from each other
in many respects, including welfare. Sen’s (1976) inﬂuential paper has clearly
argued why such differences should matter for poverty measurement3. Logically,
they should also matter for assessing the poverty effectiveness of policies and
programs. OnemotivationforthisiswellsummarizedbyGroshandBaker(1995):
While it is unsatisfactory to fail to cover those who fall below the
poverty line, the error is less grave if the people who are excluded fall
only just below the poverty line rather than at the very bottom of the
welfare distribution. (p. 13)
Thus, the use of exclusion errors and under-coverage ratios will often fail to
present a distribution-sensitive picture of the impact of programs on the poor4.
Grosh and Baker (1995) go on arguing that
Thebestwaytojudgewhetherthelevelsandtrade-offsbetweenunder-
coverage and leakage are acceptable is to calculate the changes in the
poverty indices that result from the different models. The model that
reduces poverty the most given a ﬁxed budget is the most acceptable.
(p. 13)
This is precisely the approach we will follow in this paper. In doing this, we
will, however, also outline a general method that brings distribution-sensitivity
formally into the study of the poverty impact of social programs. An important
objective of the paper is to highlight the role and the presence of horizontal equity,
whose worthiness as a moral goal is virtually unanimously recognized but which
has been typically neglected in policy discussions of targeting and policy allevia-
tion issues. In comparing poverty before and after a policy, or across two policies,
we will thus account for the role of three summary indicators:
² The ﬁrst indicator is the rate of leakage, deﬁned as in the earlier studies.
This will capture how much of a program’s resources are ”wasted” on the
non-poor. This indicator is only affected by the assumed demarcation be-
tween the poor and the non-poor – it is not sensitive to the distribution of
the policy impact among the poor.
3On this, see also among many others Foster (1984), Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984),




3² The second indicator is a measure of the vertical equity (VE) of the pro-
grams. VE demands a search for a reduction in the welfare gaps that sep-
arate unequal individuals. This second indicator will capture the extent to
which vertical inequality in the distribution of poverty gaps is reduced by
a program, and also therefore the extent to which errors of exclusion affect
more the not-so-poor than the very poor.
² The third indicator captures the horizontal equity (HE) of a program. Our
deﬁnition of HE will be in line with the traditional or ”classical” HE ap-
proach, which deﬁnes HE as ”the equal treatment of equals” (see Musgrave,
1959). There is horizontal inequity (HI) when equals are treated unequally.
The combination of the above three indicators captures the trade-off between the
usual targeting accuracy (leakage), VE and HI components. As we will see, this
information can be useful for descriptive as well as for policy design purposes.
Note again that the leakage and under-coverage rates used in earlier studies are
not sensitive to the distribution among the poor of the impact of targeting errors.
The exclusion of a very poor counts in exactly the same way as the exclusion of
a not-so-poor, which thus contradicts a basic property for a proper VE indicator.
Moreover, neither of these rates is truly horizontal since neither captures whether
pre-program welfare-similar poor are treated the same way by the program.
Instead, this paper uses local HI indicators that assess whether the same treat-
ment is granted to all of the poor of the same pre-program welfare level5. The
starting point for the computation of HI is the ”local” dispersion of post-policy
poverty gaps among individuals having the same pre-policy poverty gap. Aggre-
gation of these local dispersion indicators across welfare levels leads to a global
HE indicator.
In decomposing the change in poverty caused by a program, we further import
to poverty measurement the concept of the ”cost of inequality” – a concept that
has been very inﬂuential in the literature on inequality measurement (see Kolm,
1969, and Atkinson, 1970). The poverty-alleviation effectiveness of a policy is
then a function of the leakage that it involves and of the change in the cost of
inequality that it causes. For this, the poverty measures to be used will naturally
gain from being distribution sensitive6. This change in the cost of inequality is
5Ravallion (1998) uses an analogous idea, but at an aggregate level: he captures horizontal
inequity in China by the difference in expected program allocation between two departments (of a
given province) with the same poverty measure.
6See Zheng (1997) on this.
4then further decomposed into VE and HI components. To take HI seriously and
to grant it an ethical importance that is distinct from that of increasing the verti-
cal distances between individuals, we need to allow the aversion towards vertical
inequality to differ from that towards the horizontal inequality introduced by a
social program, in the manner for instance of Auerbach and Hasset (2002) for the
analysis of inequality and social welfare. We therefore assign VE and HE each its
own inequity-aversion parameter.
One of the main uses of this paper’s methodological development would cer-
tainly seem to be to examine whether program reforms could be implemented
to alleviate poverty further and better. We illustrate this using micro-data from
the 1990 Tunisian Household Expenditure Survey. In doing this, we make use
of non-parametric estimation procedures to assess the extent of VE and HI. We
ask whether it would be poverty effective to substitute a direct transfer program –
based on socio-demographic proxy means-tests – to the current universal food
subsidy system – ”commodity targeting” – currently in place in Tunisia. We
ﬁnd that socio-demographic targeting would generate signiﬁcantly more HI, al-
though it would display a lower leakage rate and a greater VE than the current
commodity-targeting program. Hence, whether one is socially preferable to the
other depends on the policymaker’s parameters of vertical and horizontal inequity
aversion.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 situates and motivates
this paper’s analysis of HE. Section 3 presents the measurement techniques. Sec-
tion 4 discusses the statistical procedures to be used to apply these techniques.
Section 5 applies the methodology to the 1990 Tunisian household survey, and
Section 6 concludes.
2 Horizontal equity in theory and in practice
Taking HE into account would seem to matter both in theory and in practice. On
the one hand, there is virtual consensus among analysts on the moral importance
of the HE criterion. On the other hand, because households’ preferences and
characteristics are heterogeneous, and because the impact of most forms of pub-
lic intervention is intrinsically non-deterministic, social programs and economic
policy will commonly generate violations of HE. We consider each of these two
issues in turn.
52.1 Horizontal equity in theory
Recall that the classical deﬁnition of HE is that equals should be treated equally.
While this principle is generally well accepted, different rationales have been ad-
vanced to support it. First, a policy which discriminates across comparable indi-
viduals is liable to create resentment and insecurity, possibly also leading to social
instability. This is supported by the socio-psychological literature which shows
that exclusion and discrimination have an impact both on individual well-being
and on social cohesion and welfare. Second, the search for vertical redistribution,
which is a key objective of many programs and policies, is generally undermined
by HI since HI pulls equals apart. Hence, a desire for HE can simply derive from
an aversion to inequality, without invoking a separate normative basis for HE.
Third, HE can also be argued to be an ethically more robust moral criterion
than VE. Depending on one’s ethical attitude towards distributive fairness, the
implications in terms of vertical justice can vary considerably, but the principle
of HE would appear to remain essentially invariant across analysts (Musgrave,
1990). This has led several authors (including Stiglitz, 1982, Balcer and Sadka,
1986 and Hettich, 1983) to advocate a separate moral treatment for HE. HE should
then be treated and assessed separately from VE, and should form a criterion on
its own in analyzing the trade-off between two policies. As in all trade-offs, it is
clear that violations of HE are often inevitable (although still regrettable), such
as when some forms of behavior are encouraged for economic efﬁciency or VE
reasons. One goal of this paper is to show how the terms of this trade-off can be
weighted in practice.
There would also seem to exist some ”micro” foundations for HE. For exam-
ple, the theory of relative deprivation (which is well documented in the socio-
psychological literature) suggests that people often speciﬁcally compare their rel-
ative individual fortune with that of others in similar or close circumstances. In
a discussion of the post-war British welfare state, Runciman (1966) notes for in-
stance that
the reference groups of the recipients of welfare were virtually bound
toremainwithinthebroadlydelimitedareaofpotentialfellow-beneﬁciaries.
It was anomalies within this area which were the focus of successive
grievances, not the relative prosperity of people not obviously com-
parable.(p.71)
Similarly, in his theory of social comparison processes, Festinger (1954) argues
that ”given a range of possible persons for comparison, someone close to one’s
6own ability or opinion will be chosen for comparison” (p.121).
It must be said that, although widely recognized, the value of studying HE has
not always been universally accepted. There are two reasons for this. The ﬁrst
is that utilitarianism and the Pareto principle may justify the unequal treatment of
equals7. King (1983a) and others see, however, this implication as a ﬂaw of strict
utilitarianism since it ignores the fairness of the redistributive process. A number
of authors have also questioned the empirical feasibility of studying classical HE
since no two individuals are ever exactly alike in a ﬁnite sample8. The proposed
alternative was then to focus on re-ranking9. We choose not to follow the re-
ranking approach here, for two reasons. First, we do address the above-mentioned
feasibility problem below. Second, it can be argued (see King, 1983a, and Duclos
et al., 2002) that absence of re-ranking and classical HE are logically equivalent
equity criteria, although the measure of their respective violations can of course
differ. Hence, we focus in this paper on the study of classical HI as opposed to
re-ranking, although as shown in Duclos et al. (2002) the two approaches could
be integrated in a single framework, but at some cost in terms of expositional
simplicity.
2.2 Horizontal equity in practice
Violations of HE seem to abound in practice. As mentioned brieﬂy above, the
reasons are many and are due largely to household heterogeneity, informational
problems, administrative errors, randomness in the effect of programs and poli-
cies, andoutrightdiscrimination. AgoodexampleofthelatterisgivenbyNarayan
and Petesch (2002):
Despite ofﬁcial rules that make discrimination illegal, behavior by
state, market, and civic institutions reﬂects prejudice against poor
people, women, and excluded social groups. (...) Excluded social
groups include the Roma in Bulgaria, the low castes and untouch-
ables in India, ”the hated poor” in Bangladesh, indigenous and Afro-
American groups in Latin America, and slum dwellers everywhere.
(...) Poor people reported that government service providers invari-
ably reach the rich over the bodies of the poor. In India the rich get
7See for instance Kaplow (1989, 1995).
8See inter alia Feldstein (1976), and Plotnick (1982, 1985).
9This is nicely discussed in the survey by Jenkins and Lambert (1999) and by Plotnick’s (1999)
comments on it.
7to the front of the line for services even when poor people have been
waiting for hours. In several places people said that service providers
ﬁrst look at their face, name, or address and then decide whether they
deserve any attention. Poor people also experience discriminatory
behavior from members of society at large. (p. 479-480)
Other sources of HI appear to be more subtle. Several recent studies sug-
gest that the case of Chinese inter-provincial and intra-provincial (inter-country)
allocations of funds provides an interesting case of ”ofﬁcial” discrimination. Ofﬁ-
cially, transfer-recipient countries are chosen according to whether mean country
income falls below some threshold. These thresholds, however, sometimes vary
arbitrarily across regions. Indeed, Park et al. (2002) ”ﬁnd that political factors
have inﬂuenced the selection of poor countries. (...) Initial designations favored
minority and revolutionary base areas, were not equitable across provinces, and
were affected by lobbying efforts” (p. 125). Besides, there is poor targeting at
sub-country level, for political and administrative reasons.
Ravallion (1998, p.27) also concludes that decentralization generated substan-
tial ”horizontal inequality” in public spending on poor areas. Interestingly, he
suggests that ”the allocation to a province should depend not only on how poor
the province is, but on how successful it is at discriminating in favor of poor ar-
eas.” This would help in reducing HI within provinces. Jalan and Ravallion(1998)
also report that, in the late 1980’s, about half of the poor people in four Southern
provinces did not live in the countries ofﬁcially designated poor by the Chinese
government (see also Riskin, 1994). This is clearly another example of unequal
treatment across poor of similar welfare levels.10
Indirect transfers provide another source of HI. For instance, Adams (2000)
reports that, in urban Egypt, the main subsidized food – coarse baladi bread –
is consumed more by the poor than by the non-poor. The food subsidy system
would thus appear somewhat self-targeted to the urban poor, since it subsidizes
”inferior” goods. Relative to lump-sum transfers, the system therefore involves a
lower leakage and a greater VE among the urban population. But the rural poor
consume less of baladi bread than the urban poor. They also have a lower baladi
consumption than the rural non-poor, and thus receive less in food subsidy than
those rural non-poor. Hence, not only is the baladi subsidy less vertically effective
in rural areas, it also introduces HI between the rural and urban poor.
Clearly, these issues are policy-relevant in the context of many other devel-
oping (and developed) countries. They will also arise in the Tunisian case to be
10A similar story seems to hold for Indonesia’s regional disbursements – see Ravallion (1993).
8examined in Section 5, using the methodology that we are now going to develop.
3 Measuring poverty and equity
3.1 Poverty and inequality
Consider a vector y = (y1;y2;:::;yN;n1;n2;:::;nN) of living standards yh (in-
comes, for short) for a population of n =
PN
h=1 nh individuals. Let the poverty
line be denoted as z. A useful tool in this paper will be that of poverty gaps,
deﬁned for an individual at yh as
gh(z) = max(z ¡ yh;0): (1)
g(z) = (g1(z);:::;gN(z);n1;n2;:::;nN) is then the vector of poverty gaps. Many
of the common poverty measures can be expressed in terms of poverty gaps11.
An important subset of these measures is the class of the FGT (Foster, Greer and







where ® may be considered as a measure of aversion to inequality among the
poor: a larger ® gives a greater weight to a loss of income to the poorest than to
the not-so-poor. When ® becomes very large, P®(g(z)) approaches a Rawlsian
measure, which essentially depends only on the poorest individual’s income.13
These poverty measures are non increasing in yh and are symmetric or anonymous
with regard to individual incomes. P0(g(z)) gives the headcount ratio, which is
well-known for being inter alia insensitive to falls in the welfare of the poor.
P1(g(z)) yields the average poverty gap, which is not sensitive to the distribution
of well-being among the poor. When ® > 1, however, the P®(g(z)) are strictly
11On this, see for instance Jenkins and Lambert (1997). Note that focussing on poverty gap
measures is not needed for the analysis, although it simpliﬁes the exposition. The same is true for
the use of the FGT indices in the paper: other additive indices, such as the Watts (1968) index,
could equally be used.
12The indices in (2) are non-normalized FGT indices, and are used here for expositional sim-
plicity (see also inter alia Chakravarty and Mookherjee (1998)). The normalized version is deﬁned
in terms of relative poverty gaps, gh(z)=z.
13See Rawls (1971).
9convex in yh, and this ensures that an equalizing transfer of income from a poor
person to anyone who is poorer decreases P®(g(z)), thus making these indices
distribution sensitive.
A simple monotonic transformation of P®(g(z)) leads to a useful money-
metric measure of poverty. In the manner of Atkinson (1970) for the measurement
of social welfare and inequality, let Γ®(g(z)) be the ”equally-distributed equiva-
lent (EDE) poverty gap”, viz, that poverty gap which, if assigned equally to all
individuals, would produce the same poverty measure as that generated by the ac-
tual distribution of poverty gaps. Using (2), Γ®(g(z)) is given implicitly for ® > 0
as
Γ®(g(z))
® ´ P®(g(z)) (3)
and thus we have
Γ®(g(z)) = P®(g(z))
1
® for ® > 0: (4)
Note that Γ1(g(z)) is the average poverty gap. Sen’s (1976) N axiom argues that
this is an adequate poverty measure only if all the poor have the same income.
Otherwise, using Γ1(g(z)) will fail to capture the inequality in the distribution of
poverty (as distinct from its average intensity). This argues that Γ®(g(z)) should
in general be greater than Γ1(g(z)) in order for Γ®(g(z)) to be sensitive to the
presence of inequality among the poor. This is achieved only when ® is strictly
greater than 1, which we therefore impose as a condition on the indices in (2).
Whenever all have the same poverty gap, Γ®(g(z)) = Γ1(g(z)) whatever the
value of a positive ®. A mean-preserving increase in the spread between a poor
person and someone less poor will increase Γ®(g(z)). Thus, for a given ®, the
more important the difference between Γ®(g(z)) and Γ1(y;z), the more unequal
we can think the distribution of poverty gaps to be. An obvious measure of the
cost of inequality in the distribution of poverty gaps is then given by:
C®(g(z)) = Γ®(g(z)) ¡ Γ1(g(z)) for ® ¸ 1: (5)
Note that C®(g(z)) is given in per capita money-metric terms, which makes it
directlycomparable to Γ1(g(z)). It isalwaysnon-negative. Itcan alsobeshownto
be a natural transposition of the cost-of-inequality approach proposed by Atkinson
(1970) in the context of social welfare to a case in which the incomes of all the
non-poor have been set equal to z. Rewriting (5), total poverty can be expressed
as:
Γ®(g(z)) = Γ1(g(z)) + C®(g(z)); ® ¸ 1: (6)
10This is illustrated in Figure 1. It shows a distribution of 2 poverty gaps,
g1(z) and g2(z) (measured along the horizontal scale), the poverty index P®(g(z))
for that distribution, the average poverty gap Γ1(g(z)), and the EDE poverty
gap Γ®(g(z)). Note that Γ1(g(z)) is the average of g1(z) and g2(z), and that
(Γ®(g(z)))
® = P®(g(z)) is the average of g1(z)® and g2(z)®. The cost of in-
equality is the horizontal distance between Γ1(g(z)) and Γ®(g(z)).
Note that it is only when the poverty gaps are equally distributed across the
total population that the cost of inequality becomes zero. For ® > 1, C®(g(z))
will be positive so long as at least one member of the population is non-poor and
one other is poor, even if all of the poor have the same income. Note that this
differs from the implication of Sen’s (1976) N axiom which deals with inequality
only among the poor.
3.2 Targeting and equity
Now consider two policy regimes, one which leads to an income distribution y1
andasecondwhichgeneratesy2, withrespectiveyi
h, gi
h(z)andgi(z), i = 1;2. For
expositional and analytical simplicity, we will assume that these two regimes are
overall-budget-neutral for the government, and that both cost a per capita amount
of ½.
3.2.1 Leakage
For each regime, the average poverty gap, Γ1(g(z)), is decreased by a per capita
amount given by ½ minus the per capita leakage of the beneﬁt. This leakage is
given for policy i by
L
i(z) = ½ ¡ (Γ1(g(z)) ¡ Γ1(g
i(z)): (7)
The leakage can arise from beneﬁt spills onto the non-poor, but as in Creedy
(1996) Li(z) also includes the value of the transfers that raise the pre-policy poor
above the poverty line. Note also that Li(z) can be affected by the presence of
some economic-efﬁciency-beneﬁts and economic-inefﬁciency-costs of the policy.
It is therefore not theoretically bounded by 0 or by ½. Note further that ½ will
be negative if the policy raises positive tax revenues. In that case, Li(z) will be
negative and lower in absolute value than ½, indicating that a part of the tax is
borne by the non-poor.
Li(z)capturespolicyi’sabilitytoawardbeneﬁtstothepoorpeople, regardless
of their poverty level. Since the poor can vary greatly in these poverty levels,
11leakage can only be one of the determinants of the social impact of a poverty
alleviation policy.
3.2.2 Horizontal equity
The ”equals” that the HE principle requires to treat alike (Feldstein, 1976) are
typically considered to be those with the same utility. Since utility is difﬁcult
to infer, a natural approximation would seem to be to consider as equals those
having the same pre-reform standard of living, or, said differently, those with the
same income (suitably adjusted, if need be, for differences in individual needs,
family composition, and prices faced). In the context of the analysis of poverty-
alleviation effectiveness, another natural assumption would be that the HE princi-
ple would not take into account the variability of the treatment of the non-poor.14
For any ﬁxed yh in pre-policy y, let Ω(yh) denote the group of persons having
yh before the policy: this is the group of nh equals located at income yh. The
local presence of HI at yh generates post-policy inequality within the members of
Ω(yh). Let °i



















1(z) = n¡1 PN
h=1 nh°i
1(yh;z).
Using the cost-of-inequality approach developed earlier, a natural measure of the








1(yh;z) ¸ 0: (9)
The EDE gap °i
¯(yh;z) can be interpreted as the HI-adjusted post-policy poverty
gap. In a context of risk aversion in which individuals would be assumed to aug-
ment their post-policy expected poverty gap by a risk premium, this risk premium
would be given by ´i





¯(yh;z) can thus be interpreted as
14 This latter assumption wouldseem relatively uncontroversialhere, butmay not be appropriate
in the more general context in which a policy can tax incomes as well as supplement them. HI
among the initially non-poor could then easily bring some of them underneath the poverty line.
The cost of HI among the initially non-poor would then enter through the increase in poverty
generated by these discriminated non-poor.
12the local welfare cost of HI, a welfare cost which adds to the post-policy average
poverty gap of those individuals at yh.
An obvious next step is to aggregate the ´i
¯(yh;z) across the yh. Using popu-











Let us now focus on the distribution of the local EDE poverty gaps °i
¯(yh;z). As
arguedabove, thisdistributionisarguablyagoodindicatorofindividualwelfarein

















¯(z)) can then be interpreted as the cost of inequality of a post-policy distri-
bution in which everyone is attributed his risk-adjusted poverty gap. The VE of
that policy can presumably be measured by the difference between that cost and
the initial cost of inequality. In other words, we can deﬁne the VE of policy i as:
V
i
®;¯(z) = C®(g(z)) ¡ C®(°
i
¯(z)): (12)
Ceteris paribus, the larger the value of V i
®;¯(z), the more vertically equitable is
policy i.
3.3 Overall policy effectiveness
As argued in the introduction, a natural measure of the poverty effectiveness of a
policy is given by the fall in poverty that results from moving from the pre-policy
distribution of poverty gaps, g(z), to the post-policy distribution of EDE poverty
gaps, °i
¯(z). Policy effectiveness is thus given by:
E
i
®;¯(z) = Γ®(g(z)) ¡ Γ®(°
i
¯(z)): (13)
15 This ensures that Hi
¯(z) in (10) is unaffected by vertical considerations, viz, it ensures that
the importance attributed to some local HI does not depend upon the income level at which it
is experienced – see Musgrave (1990). This across-group aggregation is analogous to that of
Blackorby et al. (1981). It is also followed by Lambert and Ramos (1997), Duclos and Lambert
(2000) and Bibi (2002a).
13The following then obtains.
Theorem 1 With degrees ® and ¯ of preference for VE and HE respectively, the
policy effectiveness of a policy i is given by
E
i







The policy effectiveness is thus a simple sum of budgetary outlay, the rate of
leakage, andverticalandhorizontalequity. Denote∆E®;¯(z) = E2
®;¯(z)¡E1
®;¯(z)
and deﬁne ∆L(z), ∆V®;¯(z) and ∆H¯(z) analogously.
Corollary 2 Assuming equal budgetary expenditures on policies 1 and 2, the dif-
ference in policy effectiveness between these two policies is given by:
∆E®;¯(z) = ¡∆L(z) + ∆V®;¯(z) ¡ ∆H¯(z): (15)
Note that (15) shows clearly the nature of the trade-off that can emerge be-
tween targeting accuracy and vertical and horizontal equity. Clearly, policy 2 will
be more effective (∆E®;¯(z) > 0) if it involves a lower leakage of resources, a
larger degree of VE and/or a lower degree of HI than policy 1. A policy can dom-
inate another even with a higher leakage and a lower degree of vertical equity if it
is horizontally more equitable. Note that the measure of leakage is independent of
® and ¯ and is thus distribution-insensitive among the poor. Conversely, VE and
HI are distribution sensitive and do depend on the inequity-aversion parameters ®
and ®.
The following interpretive remarks should be useful (the proofs of most the
assertions are proved in the appendix).
1. ¯ can be usefully interpreted as the degree of aversion to HI within groups
of local equals, and ® as the degree of aversion to inequality across these
groups.
2. When ® = ¯ = 1, V i
1;1(z) = Hi
1(z) = 0, which also says that differences in
policy effectiveness then depend solely on differences in beneﬁt leakage.
3. When ® = ¯, HI counts in the policy assessment only in so much as it adds
to the vertical distances between individuals. No separate ethical aversion







14Vertical equity minus horizontal inequity explains entirely the change in the
cost of inequality between the pre- and post-policy distributions of poverty
gaps. Hi
®(z)againmattersonlyinasmuchasitaddstothecostofinequality
in gi(z). From this, it also follows that
E
i
®;®(z) = ½ ¡ L
i(z) + C®(g(z)) ¡ C®(g
i(z)) (17)
and
∆E®;®(z) = ¡∆L(z) + C®(g
1(z)) ¡ C®(g
2(z)): (18)
4. The case in which ® and ¯ are equal is clearly a special one. Indeed, in the
words of Auerbach and Hasset (2002, p.1116), ”if horizontal equity is to
have any independent content, it seems both necessary and appropriate for
attitudes to differ about these two types of inequality”. There are two other
possible cases. To consider them, assume that HI affects the incomes of at
least some of the poor.
(a) Whenever ® < ¯, HI has an adverse policy impact in excess of its
widening of the distances between individuals. In such instances, it
follows that distributive effectiveness (V i
®;¯(z)¡Hi
¯(z)) is then judged





¯(z) < C®(g(z)) ¡ C®(g
i(z)): (19)
(b) By setting ¯ < ®, it is also possible for a policy analyst to discard,
downplayorhide HIandthedispersionintroducedbyit. Insuchcases,






¯(z) > C®(g(z)) ¡ C®(g
i(z)): (20)
The particular case of setting ¯ = 1 is in fact equivalent to replacing
all post-policy poverty gaps by their expected value (conditional on
their pre-policy initial value). This is in fact what is done when policy
simulation analysis is performed assuming that the impact of a pol-
icy can depend only on pre-policy income – assuming away all other
factors of variability.
5. Observe that the result in (14) makes it possible to be averse to HI even in
the absence of a preference for VE (viz, when ¯ > ® = 1). This could
15describe the ethical attitude of ”contractarian” policymakers (see, for in-
stance, Nozick, 1974), who are typically more concerned with the fairness
of a process than by its redistributive effect.
6. Finally, differentethicalpreferencestowardsVEandHEcanimplydifferent
policy effectiveness judgements. This will be illustrated below. In fact, the
greater the value of ¯, the closer the local post-policy EDE poverty gaps
°i
¯(yh;z) become to the poverty gap of the worst off in that local group of
equals. As ¯ approaches inﬁnity, policy effectiveness is assessed on the
basis of a set of local Rawlsian judgements, viz, it is judged using the fate





























3.4 Robustness of results
The policy implications of the above methodology can potentially depend arbi-
trarily on the choice of a poverty line z and of a poverty measure. The application
of well-known results from the stochastic dominance literature shows, however,
that (setting ® = ¯) if ∆E®;®(z) ¸ 0 for a range of poverty lines that starts at 0
and extends to z+, then policy 2 will necessarily be judged to reduce poverty by
more than policy 1 for any choice of poverty line within [0;z+] and for any choice
of poverty index within a class of ethical order ® + 1.16
For ® = 1 (second-order poverty dominance), this test simply involves differ-
ences between the leakages of the two policies since we then have ∆E1;1(z) =
¡∆L(z). Since ∆E1;1(z) = ½ ¡ L2(z) ¡ (½ ¡ ∆L1(z)) The test can also be
made using the difference between the cumulative beneﬁts of policies 2 and 1 up
to varying values of z. For tests of second-order dominance, the measures of HE
and VE in (15) are therefore not (directly) relevant.
Forthird-orderpovertydominance, onecheckswhether∆E2;2(z) = ¡∆L(z)+
∆V2;2(z) ¡ ∆H2(z) ¸ 0. Note that if for some ®, ∆E®;®(z) is not of the desired
16See, for example, Atkinson (1987), Foster and Shorrocks (1988), Ravallion (1994) or Duclos
and Makdissi (2002).
16sign over the speciﬁed range of poverty lines, one can focus on classes of poverty
indices of higher ethical orders simply by increasing the value of ® and ¯ and
hence giving simultaneously more weight to VE and HI (since increasing ® and ¯
will not affect ∆L(z)).
4 Statistical procedure
It will generally be the case that the sample data available to carry out the type
of analysis described above will have been drawn from a continuous17 joint pop-
ulation distribution of pre-policy and post-policy incomes. Because of this, the
probability of observing exact pre-policy equals in any sample would appear to
be very small. Using sample data to estimate classical HI would thus seem prob-
lematic. This has been known for a long time as the ”identiﬁcation of equals”
problem.
As in Duclos and Lambert (2000), however, we suggest tackling this problem
through a non-parametric estimation of the joint distribution of pre-policy and
post-policy incomes. In practice, this is done below using kernel density estima-
tion with a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth-selection procedure suggested by
Silverman (1986). The method is described in some detail in Duclos and Lambert
(2000). For a hint of the procedure, let the estimator of the conditional density of
post-policy i’s income given yh, fi(yjyh), be given by ˆ fi(yjyh). We then estimate
°i

















naturally after computing ˆ °i
¯(yh;z) at each point yh observed in the data. Note that
expressions like Γ®(g(z)), C®(g(z)), Li(z) and Ei
®(z) can be estimated straight-
forwardly from the empirical or sample distributions of pre- and post-policy in-
comes.
5 An application to Tunisia
We illustrate the use of the methodology presented above using a 1990 Tunisian
survey, ”Enquˆ ete Nationale sur le Budget et la Consommation des M´ enages 1990”
17Approximately so, at least in the case of large populations.
17(National Household Budget and Expenditure Survey). This household survey
is multipurpose and provides reliable information on consumption expenditures
for various items as well as extensive socio-demographic information on 7734
households. The survey does not, however, include information on incomes. We
thus use total household expenditure (divided by household size) for valuing and
comparing individual well-being in our Tunisian data. Note also that we suppose
that this initial distribution of well-being is horizontally equitable18.
The main anti-poverty program currently in force in Tunisia is based on the
subsidization of food consumption and thus on ”commodity targeting”. 19 Gov-
ernmentexpendituresonthatprogramhavebeensubstantialthroughoutthe1980’s
and the 1990’s, amounting to 4.1% of GDP in 1984, 2.9% in 1990, and 2% in
1995. It would thus seem instructive to compare the outcome of this program with
that of an alternative one based, for instance, on targeting by socio-demographic
indicators – referred to as ”socio-demographic targeting” in this paper. For this,
we use here an illustrative socio-demographic targeting program that involves
householdproxy-meanstestssubjecttothesameaggregatebudgetasthatforcom-
modity targeting. The program ﬁrst estimates an ordinary-least-squares model to
predict households’ income using easily observable variables, namely, the region
of residence and the demographic structure of the households. The program then
assigns to the household with the highest predicted poverty gap a per capita trans-
fer that lowers its poverty gap to the next highest one. This is followed by a trans-
fer to these ﬁrst two households that lowers their predicted poverty gap to that of
the next poorest household. This pattern is repeated until all available funds are
disbursed. This procedure yields a detailed schedule of transfers that depend on
observable socio-demographic characteristics.
Comparing the outcomes of commodity and socio-demographic targeting re-
quires an estimator of individual well-being that is sensitive to price variations.
Following King’s (1983b) methodology, we use a vector of reference prices to
compute a distribution of real (or ”equivalent”) incomes under commodity tar-
geting (policy 1) as well as under socio-demographic targeting (policy 2). The
reference prices are given by those in the absence of the policies, viz, by those
prices that we suppose would prevail in the absence of any of these anti-poverty
programs. To compute equivalent incomes and the size of the deadweight losses,
we use the results of Bibi’s (2002b) estimation of a Tunisian commodity demand
18For alternative assumptions, see inter alia Atkinson (1979), Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995), and
Kaplow (1989, 1995)
19 Details about this program can be found in Tuck and Lindert (1996). See also World Bank
(1995).
18system, whichfoundthattheaggregatedeadweightlossamountstoapproximately
16.7 % of the total food subsidy budget. A real per capita poverty line z of 360
Tunisian Dinars (TD) per year is used as a reference line. This corresponds to
approximately 50% of mean expenditure and is roughly equal to the often-used
US$1-a-day line. For expositional convenience, we normalize all of this section’s
money-metric indicators by that poverty line.
Figure 2 shows a scatter-plot distribution of equivalent incomes under com-
moditytargeting(the”+”distribution)andsocio-demographictargeting(thepoints
linked by lines). Pre-policy incomes are expressed as a proportion of the reference
poverty line. The thickness of the 45-degree line is explained by the presence of
many households who receive no beneﬁt from socio-demographic targeting. HI
occurs whenever data points on this scatter plot are vertically aligned. A quick
look at Figure 2 shows immediately that socio-demographic targeting violates HE
considerably more than commodity targeting. In other words, at some given level
of well-being, there is less variability in the impact of commodity targeting than
in that of socio-demographic targeting. Said differently, the differences in socio-
demographic indicators are larger than those in food consumption at a given level
of well-being. This is in fact reminiscent of the difﬁculties faced by the (small)
existing socio-demographic targeting programs in Tunisia, alluded to for instance
in World Bank (1995): ”(Their) coverage is still inadequate. As a result, many
of the truly needy do not beneﬁt from the program, while others receive multiple
beneﬁts from various social assistance and insurance programs.”
Although HI would appear more important under socio-demographic targeting
than under commodity targeting, Figure 2 also suggests that the expected income
at each pre-policy income level up to z is always higher under socio-demographic
targetingthanundercommoditytargeting–thelocalaveragesofthe+’sarehigher
than the local averages of the points linked by the lines. This is conﬁrmed by Fig-
ure 3, where the top line (the one with the ”+”) shows at different pre-policy in-
come the expected beneﬁt under socio-demographic targeting, and where the line
with the ”±” shows the expected beneﬁt under commodity targeting. Targeting by
socio-demographic indicators would therefore look more supportive of the poor
in general, and more supportive of the very poor in particular. Because of this, it
would seem to be vertically more equitable and also to cause lower leakages.
Quantitative estimates of the overall comparative policy effectiveness of the
two targeting schemes are summarized in Table 1. All numbers are expressed
as a percentage of the reference poverty line. The initial average poverty gap
is 9.9% of the poverty line. It is reduced to 7.87% under commodity targeting




programmes for three different values of ¯ = 2;4;8. The larger the aversion to HI,
themorenegativeisthatdifference, thuscapturingthefactthatsocio-demographic
targeting is judged less and less desirable as the policymaker’s ethical dislike for
treating equals unequally is increased. For ¯ equal to or greater than 4, the higher
cost of HI for socio-demographic targeting (relative to commodity targeting) out-
weighs that scheme’s lower leakage rate.
Assuspectedabove, thefollowinglinesshow, however, thatsocio-demographic
targeting is vertically more equitable than commodity targeting. Recall from (3)
that when ® = ¯, no separate ethical weight to HI is given: all that matters from a
re-distributive point of view is the size of the vertical distances between individu-
als, and HI matters only in so much as it increases such distances. From (16), the
cost of inequality when ® = ¯ = 2 for instance is reduced by V i
2;2(z) ¡ Hi
2(z).
Added to the fact that it involves lower leakages, this greater vertical effectiveness
of socio-demographic targeting leads to greater policy effectiveness Ei
2;2 for that
type of targeting. Socio-demographic targeting is therefore judged to be the more
effective of the two schemes when violations of HI are not granted separate ethical
importance.
This is conﬁrmed by the stochastic dominance tests of Figure 4. Figure 4
compares the difference between the cumulative beneﬁts of socio-demographic
and commodity targeting over a bottom range of poverty lines that extends well
beyond the reference line (which is shown as 100% on the Figure). The cumula-
tive beneﬁts of socio-demographic targeting always exceed substantially those of
commodity targeting over the range of poverty lines up to the reference one. Said
differently, since the outlays on the two programs are the same, the rate of leak-
age for commodity targeting always exceeds that for socio-demographic targeting
whenever a poverty line less than or equal to the reference line is used. Socio-
demographic targeting is therefore second-order poverty dominant. This also
means that socio-demographic targeting will always be judged policy-superior
whenever the measure ∆E®;®(z) is computed for any ® ¸ 1 and for any z lower
than or equal to our reference poverty line (in fact, for any z on the Figure).
Such stochastic dominance tests (and standard poverty analysis) impose that
® = ¯ and do not, therefore, give HI ”any independent content” (recall Auerbach
and Hasset’s quote). To show why giving HI independent ethical content can mat-
ter, consider Figure 5, which displays the local cost of HI at different poverty lines
for ¯ = 4. That cost is clearly much greater under socio-demographic targeting
20than under commodity targeting. Figure 3 also shows the expected beneﬁt under
both targeting schemes net of the money-metric ethical cost of HI, and this, using
¯ = 4. The line with the ”¦” shows that information for commodity targeting, and
the line with the ”£” shows it for socio-demographic targeting. These two lines
thus give £







for each of the two policies, [(z ¡ yh) ¡ °i
1(yh;z)] being the average fall in the
localpovertygap, and´i
¯(yh;z)beingthelocalcostofHI.Notethatthesuperiority
of socio-demographic targeting is greatly reduced by the cost of HI. In fact, if no
weight to VE is given, then with ¯ = 4 commodity targeting is judged to be more
policy effective than socio-demographic targeting – this can be seen from the fact
that ∆E1;4(z) = ¡0:04 in Table 1.
Whether socio-demographic or commodity targeting is judged superior thus
depends on the policymaker’s comparative attitude to VE and HE. Table 1 sum-
marizes this for variouscombinations of valuesfor ® and ¯. Forrelativelylowval-
ues of ¯, socio-demographic targeting is found superior to commodity targeting.
The reverse holds for relatively large values of ¯ – for instance, both ∆E1;4(z) and
∆E2;8(z) are negative. This suggests that the status quo could indeed be deemed
preferable to a system of socio-demographic targeting that would nevertheless in-
volve greater vertical equity and lower leakages.
6 Conclusion
There is a clearly need among policymakers for meaningful descriptive and nor-
mative measures of policy effectiveness for the analysis of poverty alleviation
programs. This paper suggests an approach which brings distribution-sensitivity
formally into the assessment of such poverty effectiveness. The methodology is
intendedtocomplementthecommonuseoftwocrudeindices, the under-coverage
and the leakage ratios. An important feature of it is its formal integration of hor-
izontal and vertical equity criteria. The policy effectiveness measures are decom-
posable into leakage, vertical and horizontal components. They provide money-
metric measures of the social impact of anti-poverty programs that can be useful
both for descriptive and normative purposes.
The use of these measures is illustrated using Tunisian households’ data and
two alternative targeting schemes. The ﬁrst scheme, which is currently in force,
awards beneﬁts to the poor through foodstuff subsidization. The second scheme
targets transfers on the basis of easily observable socio-demographic indicators.
21The results show that, although commodity targeting involves higher leakages
and lower vertical equity, the fact that it is less horizontally inequitable than socio-
demographictargetingmay renderitpreferable forpolicypurposes. Hence, taking
horizontal equity seriously can have important implications for the design and the
understanding of poverty alleviation policies.
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277 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
Combining (13) and (5), we have that
E
i
®;¯(z) = Γ®(g(z)) ¡ Γ®(°
i
¯(z)) (25)









Rearranging and using (7), this gives:
E
i
®;¯(z) = Γ1(g(z)) ¡ Γ1(°
i
¯(z)) + C®(g(z)) ¡ C®(°
i
¯(z)) (27)





¯(z)) + C®(g(z)) ¡ C®(°
i
¯(z)): (28)
Note from (12) that
V
i
®;¯(z) = C®(g(z)) ¡ C®(°
i
¯(z)): (29)





































Hence, using (28), (29) and (32), Theorem 1 is obtained.
Proofs of some of the remarks of pages 14 to 16.
For remark 2, note that C1(g(z)) = C1(°i
1(z)) = 0, and that Γ1(gi(z)) =
Γ1(°i
1(z)).
























































28Using (5),(7) and (13), (16) is then obtained.




















When ® < ¯, it is clear from the mean of order ¯ in (8) that °i
®(yh;z)) ·
°i
¯(yh;z)) (with a strict inequality whenever there is HI within Ω(yh)). Using
(37) and the fact that Γ®(¢) is increasing in its arguments, this proves (19). The
reverse argument proves (20).
29Table 1: Policy effectiveness of two types of targeting in Tunisia (as a % of the
reference poverty line
Benchmark Commodity Socio-demographic Outcome
targeting targeting difference
Γ1(y;z) 9.90 7.87 5.78 -2.09
L(z) - 7.63 5.54 -2.09
H2(z) 0 0.08 1.02 0.94
H4(z) 0 0.20 2.32 2.12
H8(z) 0 0.39 3.88 3.49
V2;2(z) - 0.88 3.54 2.66
V2;4(z) - 0.89 2.28 1.39
V2;8(z) - 0.88 0.72 -0.16
E1;1(z) - 2.03 4.12 2.09
E1;2(z) - 1.95 3.10 1.15
E1;4(z) - 1.83 1.79 -0.04
E2;2(z) - 2.83 6.63 3.80
E2;4(z) - 2.72 4.08 1.36
E2;8(z) - 2.52 0.96 -1.56
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p
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ﬁ
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b
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